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1. Introduction
In Thailand, alleviation of income inequality among households
nationwide and diminishment of income disparities among the provinces
have been recognised as issues to tackle with priority since the early 1970s.２）
In an attempt to solve these issues, the Thai government tried to narrow
regional income disparities first, with the hope that this action would result
in improvement of income inequality among households. Prior to the 1997
Asian financial crisis, the Thai central government had conducted projects
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with the aim of strengthening the provincial economies and extending the
benefits of the rapid economic growth occurring in metropolitan areas
towards rural communities. The projects included establishment of local
economic infrastructures for manufacturing and productivity development
in rural agricultural sectors. By contrast, the potential for agricultural
sectors to absorb workers in urban areas who became unemployed due to
the Asian financial crisis was re-evaluated after its occurrence (Economic
Planning Agency, 1999). As a response to these circumstances, politician
Thaksin Shinawatra offered Thai voters a so-called ‘grassroots policy’ as
part of his 2000 election campaign and received support from farmers and
rural low-income residents in the north and northeast provinces. The
grassroots policy consisted of projects aimed at giving direct cash benefits
to farmers and rural residents and benefits in kind to low-income
households. In fact, once Thaksin implemented these projects during his
government between 2001 and 2006, the grassroots projects were
recognised as a policy staple for local communities regardless of which
political regime was in power. However, after the coup d’état in May 2014,
the interim government led by Prayuth Chan-ocha abolished some
grassroots projects with a belief that these projects were wasting sizeable
amounts of public expenditures and may have been utilised for corruption,
and attempts to implement other economic stimulation projects for rural
and low-income households instead of the previous grassroots projects.
This study aims to discuss several considerations important to Thailand’s
review and redesign of its grassroots policy, taking into account Thailand’s
economic and social development levels in the near future. After section 2
identifies the issues to be discussed, section 3 clarifies the perspectives
from which the government should review each grassroots project given
its current income levels. The discussion leads to a conclusion that
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Thailand can no longer use cash payment schemes whose beneficiaries are
selected based on residents’ locality or professions. Section 4 presents an
assessment of individual grassroots projects based on this perspective as
well as from the perspective of income redistributive effects and
appropriateness of beneficiaries, together with a brief examination of the
possible income redistributive effects of the Prayuth interim government’s
tax reform plan. Section 5 concludes the discussion.
2. Identification of the questions
Table 1 lists main grassroots projects, which can be grouped into three
categories. The projects (i) through (iii) focus on developing income earning
capacity in low-income rural areas (say, ‘small-scale rural development
projects’); the projects (iv) and (v) aim to increase income levels for farmers,
who generally live in rural areas and earn less than workers in urban
areas on average; and the projects (vi) through (xii) have the goal of raising
incomes and lowering living costs for low-income households, the majority
of whom live in rural areas. Projects (i) through (ix) were introduced by the
Thaksin government３）, and with some change and introduction of other
projects, the grassroots policy had been conducted until the coup d’état in
2014.
The Prayuth interim government abolished some grassroots projects
because it believed that they caused a large loss of public expenditures and
may have been used for corruption. A welfare economist, however, would
question the government’s decision-making process because the grassroots
３）The (v) rice mortgage scheme and (ix) price controls and price monitoring
regulations are usually not recognised as grassroots projects started by the
Thaksin government. These initiatives previously existed for another purpose;
the Thaksin government changed them into support measures for low-income
households.
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Table 1: Post-2000 policy measures focused on low-income households and rural
area residents
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Table 1 (continued): Post-2000 policy measures focused on low-income
households and rural area residents
(Source: By the author, using various documents and media sources.)
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policy was introduced for the purpose of narrowing regional income
disparities, which would potentially lead to improvement of income
distribution. Redesigning of individual grassroots projects is inevitable if
they cause serious side effects. However, abolishment of a project should
be determined after considering the appropriateness of targeted
beneficiaries and after examining the income redistributive effects of the
project’s goals. As long as the review finds evidence that the income
redistributive effects are sufficiently greater than the welfare loss caused
by the increase in public expenditure for the project (or concerns of
corruption in use of project funds), then the government should continue
those individual grassroots projects with any necessary redesign. If the
individual grassroots projects have a small but positive effect, the
government should not rush to abolish those projects but should amend
them to reduce any negative impacts. In both cases, the government lacks
justification for abolishing the projects from a welfare economics
perspective.
However, there are three distinct cases where abolishing projects with
sufficiently positive effects is reasonable. Firstly, if the Thai economy is at
the stage where it could benefit from worsening of income inequality, an
income-redistributive grassroots policy may hamper improvement of the
country’s social welfare. This phenomenon is linked with the well-known
‘Kuznets hypothesis’. Secondly, if the Thai government (or Thai people)
have a unique social preference for income distribution, the efforts to lower
the index value measuring the severity of income inequality may not be
equivalent to the improvement of Thailand’s social welfare, and may even
worsen it. This means that the Thai people’s social preferences should be
examined before discussing the necessity of amending or abolishing
individual grassroots projects. Finally, if the individual projects improve the
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Table 2: Identification of questions explored in this study
standard of living for low-income local residents but widen the average
income disparity between metropolitan and rural areas by hampering the
economic development of rural areas, such projects should be abandoned.
Table 2 summarises the questions presented here, and the analysis in this
study will examine the applicability of these three cases to Thailand’s
actual economic and social situations and then check the effectiveness of
individual grassroots projects.
3. True problems of grassroots projects
(1) Can Thailand accelerate its economic growth by worsening
income inequality?
Unlike the problem of poverty, we cannot automatically and
unconditionally conclude that income inequality is a problem that needs to
be solved immediately. For income inequality, there is a rule of thumb that
a society tends to become severely unstable when the ‘Gini coefficient’, a
descriptive measurement of severity of income inequality４）, exceeds 0.4. At
４）The Gini coefficient takes the value 0 for a completely equal income distribution
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values above 0.4, a government must take affirmative steps to tackle
income inequality to avoid social instability. Many scholars who claim the
need for improvement of the equity in income distribution may be basing
their claims on this rule and the fact that Thailand’s Gini coefficient was
around 0.48 as of 2013, namely, the sole evidence for these scholars to claim
that immediate action is required. In Thailand, however, the Gini coefficient
is now below 0.4 when measured by consumption expenditures. This fact
also indicates that, at least from a social stability viewpoint, the problem of
income inequality cannot automatically be labelled as a problem to be
solved immediately. In addition, looking at the situation of income
inequality in recent years with the Gini coefficient, the value has been in a
declining trend since 1992 (see Figure 1). The declining trend of the
coefficient value does not support the claim that the government has not
conducted measures for tackling income inequality at all or that it has
and 1 for a situation in which all incomes in the society goes to only one person
/household.
Figure 1: Gini coefficient in Thailand, 1988-2011
(Data source: Office for National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB)
“The Situation on Poverty in Thailand” and NESDB’s website)
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weakened its efforts.
Development economics can offer a discussion of whether income
inequality should be a problem for any country to tackle. The discussion is
based on the Kuznets (1955) hypothesis, which states that countries at the
initial stage of their economic development concentrate their limited
domestic resources on particular targeted industries in order to accelerate
their economic growth, which results in worsening of income inequality. On
the other hand, once a country reaches a certain level of economic
development, it tends to focus more on balanced and equitable growth
nationwide５）. The question now is whether Thailand is at the stage of
development where it can accelerate its economic growth by worsening
income inequality. If Thailand were currently at this stage of development,
the interim government’s decision to abolish the grassroots projects would
make sense from the context of development economics. This author’s
empirical analysis (Egawa, 2013) offers a clue for considering the threshold
where the relationship between the severity of income inequality and
economic growth rates changes. It finds that for the countries with per
capita gross domestic product (GDP) above 5,650 purchasing power parity
dollars (PPP$), their growth rate is lowered as their s5/s1 ratio６） increases.
In addition, for countries with income levels above PPP$13,073, their
growth rate is lowered as their Gini coefficient increases. As Thailand
(which has a per capita GDP of PPP$9,875 in 2013 as estimated by the
５）In fact, the applicability of the hypothesis always faces criticism in terms of
both methodology and implication. One example is Anand and Kanbur (1993)
arguing that the result of a data analysis is strongly dependent on the method
of calculating income disparity and the choice of the base year; showing those
differences can produce a U relationship, an inverse-U relationship, or no
relationship at all.
６）The s5/s1 ratio measures the income gap between the income share of the
highest quintile of income group and the lowest quintile of income group. A
greater ratio means the wider income gap.
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International Monetary Fund (IMF)) is placed between these two
thresholds, the result implies that it can accelerate its economic growth by
achieving both narrowing the income gap between the highest and lowest
income groups and worsening income inequality among all households.
Although seeking this situation is not impossible, doing so is not a good
idea considering the current stage of Thailand’s economic development.
According to the estimate by the IMF, Thailand’s per capita GDP would
exceed PPP$13,073 in 2019. Since introducing an income redistributive
measure requires amendment of taxation legislation and renewal of
taxation authorities capable of annual data compilation of household
incomes nationwide and will take much time, Thailand should immediately
begin preparing income redistributive measures in order to ensure full
implementation by 2019. Therefore, the possibility of the scenario in Table
2, question (1) is eliminated.
(2) Does the Thai society have a unique social preference for
income distribution?
The best way to examine this question is to identify the social welfare
function, but identifying a particular utility function for an average Thai
household is difficult to estimate.
Therefore, another concept of social welfare comparison is introduced
here, known as ‘Lorenz dominance’. A ‘Lorenz curve’ shows the share of
total income received by the lowest x per cent of households, with the total
share of income shown on the vertical axis (taking the value between 0 and
1) and the proportion of population shown on the horizontal axis (also
taking the value between 0 and 1). According to Atkinson’s (1970) theorem,
when two Lorenz curves are drawn and they do not intersect, the society
whose Lorenz curve is closer to the 45 degree line realises less unequal
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Figure 2: Generalised Lorenz dominance in Thailand : 2002, 2007 and 2013
(Data source: Statistical Office of Thailand “Household Socio-Economic Survey”
(various years))
income distribution than the other, irrespective of the shapes of the utility
functions of the households (this situation is called as ‘Lorenz dominance’).7）
However, the question raised earlier was whether the assessment of social
welfare might become worse even though the Gini coefficient has become
smaller. Such a situation may be realised if two Lorenz curves intersect or
if the Lorenz-dominating society has smaller incomes than the Lorenz-
dominated one, where the Atkinson theorem can no longer be applicable
(in fact, Figure 2 (left) implies that there is no Lorenz-dominant relationship
between 2002 and 2007).
Then, another normative approach of ‘Generalised Lorenz dominance’,
known as Shorrocks’ (1983) theorem, should be introduced here. It says
that the society with the greater average income enjoys the greater social
７）The only conditions are that the society has a utilitarian social welfare function
and the individual utility function is increasing, concave to income and
homogeneous among households.
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welfare irrespective of the shape of the utility function of the households
when Generalised Lorenz curves (‘GL curve’ hereafter), generated from the
Lorenz curves multiplied by the average income, do not intersect. Figure 2
(right) draws the GL curves for 2002, 2007 and 2013 to analyse whether
social welfare has kept improving after introducing the grassroots policy,
and shows that the GL curve for 2007 dominates the GL curve for 2002,
and the GL curve for 2013 dominates the GL curve for 2007. This means
that Shorrocks’ theorem is applied to the real situation in Thailand and we
can say, without identifying the household’s utility function, that Thailand
does not have a situation where social welfare worsens while the Gini
coefficient decreases (therefore, the scenario in question (2), Table 2 is also
eliminated).
(3) Are the measures for narrowing regional income disparities
always contributing to improvement of income inequality?
Now we can get to the conclusion that Thailand should immediately
implement measures for realising equity of income distribution. However,
the question of ‘how to’ alleviate income inequality in Thailand still
remains. On one hand, the Thai government has used policy measures for
rural development and various income support schemes for low-income
and rural households. On the other hand, the average income levels in the
provinces against those in Bangkok and the surrounding vicinity have
improved, at least since 2002 (Figure 3). As the Gini coefficient has
improved during that period as well, there may be a correlation between
income inequality improvement and the grassroots policy implemented
from the early 2000s.
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Figure 3 : Income and consumption expenditures in the provinces
(Bangkok and its vicinity=100)
(Note) Since 2007, the data for local average consumption were taken every year but
the data for incomes were not. Therefore the figures for 2008, 2010 and 2012
were not available from the Household Socio-Economic Survey.
(Data source: National Statistical Office of Thailand “Household Socio-Economic
Surveys” (various years))
However, past experience does not necessarily apply to future events.
Even though government initiatives for raising the level of low-income
households’ incomes and earning capability would improve the equity of
income distribution nationwide, some measures may lose effectiveness in
narrowing regional income disparities. Petty-Clark’s Law, a practical
relationship in development economics, states that at the early stage of
economic development the share of primary industries to GDP decreases
as the secondary industries develop, with the share of the tertiary
industries remaining relatively stable. As per capita GDP exceeds a certain
level, the shares of both primary and secondary industries start declining
and shares of the tertiary industries begin increasing instead. Considering
Figure 4, Petty-Clark’s Law applies to Asia’s situation and the trend of the
shares of the secondary and tertiary industries changes when the per
capita GDP level rises just above USD 5,000. If the country’s income level
is above USD 5,000, the GDP share of the tertiary industries increases as
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Figure 4: Petty-Clark’s Law in Asia, 1960-2012 (Left: Secondary industry, Right:
Tertiary industry)
(Note and data source) Data for all Asian countries and for all the years available
from the World Bank Data are used. “Asian countries” includes ASEAN
countries (Brunei and Myanmar cannot be included), Japan, Korea, China and
India.
the per capita GDP increases, whereas the GDP share of the secondary
industries starts to decline. Since Thailand’s per capita GDP in 2013 was
USD 5,370 (calculated by the IMF), the country is already at the stage of
economic development where tertiary industries should become the
leading industries.
In order for those industries to develop, population migration towards
industrial hubs will be essential. This means that the provinces which
succeed in developing industries and aggregating the rural population and
labour force into core provincial cities can increase the incomes of its
residents because this clustering activity increases the frequency of
contact between sellers and buyers, resulting in enhancement of industrial
productivity and the utility of households that use those services. In other
words, while Bangkok and its surrounding area will definitely record rapid
economic growth by the further agglomeration of population and
industries, maintaining all of the individual grassroots projects will hamper
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the development of local cities, which results in widening of regional
disparities. Therefore, the Thai government and local governments in the
rural areas should give up policies which would discourage rural people
from moving to local core cities, even though those policies may
temporarily improve rural people’s incomes.
4. An ideal way of reviewing individual grassroots projects
(1) Examination of the existence of an income redistributive effect
in each grassroots project
The first thing that the central and local governments should do is to
review whether an individual grassroots project hampers the development
of the economic capacity of core cities and to limit the use of such projects
or not. In this context, it is necessary for the central government to assure
the mobility of labour and capital by helping people and industries move
into local cities, helping local governments execute relevant programmes,
and providing additional support to residents in rural areas who, for a
variety of reasons, are unable to move. In short, the measures for local low-
income households should be concentrated and limited to rural
development projects and projects which tackle ‘social exclusion’ problems,
such as measures to prevent the poor from falling into a vicious circle of
poverty due to inability to move from rural areas and promotion measures
for the poor to enable them to relocate and work in the cities.8）Therefore,
the grassroots projects should be individually examined from the
aforementioned perspectives.
８）Social exclusion policy in general includes provision of a social safety net after
retirement age, provision of sufficient amounts of quality education and
vocational training, low-price or free provision of daily necessary goods,
prevention of increases in debt repayment burdens, establishment of physical
and social systems in which the elderly and persons with disabilities can access
the labour market and social infrastructures, and so on.
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Looking at the grassroots projects listed in Table 1, the small-scale rural
development projects (projects (i) through (iii)) do not have a counter effect
in principle because these projects are considered to develop the income
earning capacity of local communities themselves. In practice, however, (ii)
village funds and (iii) stimulus of local consumption (SML scheme) were
sometimes used merely to inject profits into individual businesses and help
individual household consumption. Plangpraphan and Jitsuchon (2007) take
the case of village funds and point out that only 25.6% of total users were
poor or low-income households and they borrowed only 2,000 to 3,000 baht
for the purpose of working capital for their current businesses. This means
that the funds were not used for development of communities’ income
earning capability. Admitting such ’wrong’ access to these projects may
result in reluctance of rural people to move to local cities. Therefore,
amending these schemes should be with the intent of avoiding wrong
access to the programmes. The project should be discontinued only if
creation of a suitable amendment is impossible.
The income support schemes for farmers (projects (iv) and (v)) have the
effect of making farmers stick to their farmland in rural areas as long as
the benefit is greater than what they would gain if they changed their
profession. Therefore, investigating the extent to which income support
has benefited farmers and what contributions, if any, these supports have
made to alleviate income inequality is necessary. Of these programmes, (iv)
the debt repayment moratorium for farmers does not need investigation
because this was a temporary, one-shot scheme. Therefore, (v) the rice
mortgage scheme is investigated in this section.
In addition, among the initiatives of income support or living cost
reduction for low-income households (projects (vi) through (xii)), no project
had a clear effect on making rural citizens reluctant to move to the cities.
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Therefore, each grassroots project should be examined to determine
whether it had an income redistributive effect. In this project category, (vi)
people’s bank is considered to have an income redistributive effect because
saving has an ‘intrapersonal-intertemporal’ effect of worsening income
inequality (Richter, 1984). Debt is considered to be negative saving and low-
income households tend to have increasing amounts of debt over time,
contrary to middle- and high-income households. As the people’s bank
aimed at shifting low-income households from high-interest informal loans
to low-interest formal loans, this project slowed the increase in the amount
of debt for low-income households. Projects such as (vii) Bahn Ua-Arthorn,
(viii) the 30-baht healthcare system, (x) the six-item-six-month policy and
(xii) allowance for the low-income elderly can be considered to have had an
income redistributive effect as well because they are regarded as social
exclusion measures, that is, these effectively assure access of low-income
households to housing, healthcare, and public services. On the other hand,
(xi) the uniform minimum wage is still difficult to analyse because of
inadequate amounts and variety of data. Therefore, the existence of income
redistributive effects for (ix) price controls and price monitoring regulations
should, and can, be examined.
1-1) Rice mortgage scheme
The rice mortgage scheme is a lending scheme from a government
financial institution (Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives
(BAAC)) under which farmers can borrow money using their rice as
collateral. As the per-unit amounts of lending from the BAAC were below
the per-unit appraised value for the collateral rice, this scheme worked
well for farmers as an option to meet urgent needs for money. However,
the Thaksin government used this project as a way of supporting farmers’
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incomes and set the appraised value for collateral rice far higher than the
market price. After several changes in the level of appraised value and
abolishment of the programme under the Democrat’s government9）,
Yingluck Shinawatra’s government set the price for collateral rice at 15,000
baht per tonne in 2011, which was said to be 30% to 40% higher than the
market price at that time. Since farmers could choose to forfeit the
collateral without any other penalty, an increasing number of farmers used
the scheme during the Yingluck government10） and intentionally gave up
repaying the money borrowed. The scheme thus became a programme
dedicated to public purchase of rice at a high price and resulted in total
destruction of the rice markets.
After setting the high-appraised value, the incomes of workers engaged
in the primary industries surged in a macroeconomic sense. However, in
terms of income inequality, there was criticism that small-scale farmers
who only produced rice for self-consumption did not have room for
bringing rice to the BAAC, which worsened income inequality.11） This
author has examined this point by having established a model and
numerically checked whether the scheme potentially worsened income
inequality (Egawa, 2014a). The result is shown in Table 3, indicating that it
is impossible to make the Gini coefficient decrease with the programme
９）The Democratic Party introduced the income compensation scheme for farmers
instead. The scheme was to compensate a proportion of the difference between
actual market prices of rice and the publicly determined reference price, in
accordance with the size of their farmlands. This initiative is similar to the rice
mortgage scheme in terms of price differential compensation, but small-scale
farmers producing rice only for self-consumption can also utilise the scheme.
Therefore, the programme can improve social welfare without changing income
inequality among farmers. There are more advantages compared to the rice
mortgage scheme in terms of efficiency and the size of budget expenditures.
１０）Egawa (2014a) estimates that 39.01% of all farmers used the scheme within the
first year of its reintroduction.
１１）For example, Chantapong and Sirikanchanarak (2012) refer to this point.
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Table 3: Potential effect of rice mortgage scheme on Gini coefficient, 2011-12
(Source: Egawa, 2014a)
unless the design is changed. The author also mathematically proves that
no linear schedule of the scheme can make the Gini coefficient decrease
(Egawa, 2014b).
1-2) Price controls and price monitoring regulations
Price controls and price monitoring regulations were initially
implemented to protect consumers from suppliers setting unreasonably
high prices, but in 2004, the Thaksin government changed the purpose to
reducing living costs for low-income households. Since then, the number of
goods and services controlled and monitored has increased, with stricter
control against price increases.
The regulations seem to supplement low-income households by
suppressing the prices of daily necessity goods. However, as this author
has pointed out, these regulations have been more beneficial to middle- and
high-income households in practice, as evidenced in the movement of the
low-income price index (LPI) and the consumer price index (CPI) (Egawa,
2013b). The rate of increase in the LPI should be below the inflation rate if
the regulations have succeeded in contributing to the welfare of low-
income households more than others, but in practice the rate of increase in
the LPI has been above the inflation rate since 2004 and the difference
between them has widened since the middle of 2006. This would happen
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when the choice of goods is misaligned, the price control is insufficient, or
both of these conditions have occurred. The author’s model can check
whether the choice of the goods and services under control was supported
by mathematical models and found to be correct and whether the actual
prices of goods and services under control were efficiently suppressed. The
results are as follows: (1) of all goods and services which came under
regulation after 2004, only 55.3% were chosen correctly; and (2) the
government failed to lower the prices of around half of the goods and
services which were correctly selected.
The analyses presented herein indicate that the grassroots projects are
correctly motivated but many of them suffered operational mistakes,
resulting in failure to improve income inequality. Moreover, there are a few
grassroots projects which were designed (intentionally or unintentionally)
to have a counter effect to income inequality improvement or have a
counter effect to the development of local core cities. As Thailand is at a
stage of development where improvement of regional income disparity no
longer guarantees more equitable income distribution and rapid economic
growth at the same time, the grassroots projects which are deemed
problematic should be redesigned or abolished.
(2) Grassroots policy as a second-best scheme
A best policy design for enhancing equitable income distribution for an
upper-middle-income country like Thailand is a package of policies which
progressively gives greater benefits to lower-income persons and asks
greater burdens to higher-income persons, irrespective of place of
residence or profession. Such a policy design would improve income
inequality first and raise the income levels of local low-income provinces
more than high-income provinces, that is, regional income disparities would
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be narrowed. In fact, if some grassroots projects are hampering the efforts
to narrow regional income disparities, the country can introduce a rich-to-
poor income redistribution policy through a taxation and benefit system
similar to that used in many advanced countries. We learn in basic
microeconomics that a direct rich-to-poor income transfer is most efficient
in improving the equity of income distribution. Among the grassroots
projects listed in Table 1, only (xii) allowance for the low-income elderly is
regarded as an income redistribution policy. This fact implies that the
current grassroots policies, as a whole, are not efficient.
Then why has the Thai government used inefficient policy measures
instead of implementing more direct income redistribution measures? One
possible reason would be that a direct transfer of income is still impossible
because the taxation authorities are still not capable of consistently
tracking annual individual household income. According to the National
Statistical Office of Thailand (2012), the segment of the population
considered to be ‘formal workers’ (workers whose income levels are
tracked by the tax authorities) in the total labour force was only 37% in
2012. Workers who earned more than 15,000 baht per month (they can be
considered as the taxpayers in reality, as the lowest taxable income limit is
150,000 baht per year) were 11.3% of the total population. This means that
any income redistribution through a combination of tax increases for high-
income earners and benefits for those whose income is below the lowest
taxable income limit will end in an income transfer from very-high-income
earners to relatively-high-income earners only inside the formal sectors.
Such a situation is far from what an income redistribution policy should
deliver. Due to these unintended consequences, the Thai government has
no choice but to use grassroots policies and the like as a second-best
choice, even though the government recognises that they are inefficient as
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income redistributive schemes.
Another reason for Thailand’s choice of grassroots policy measures
would be that, even in the situation where the government can introduce a
system to track and report individual household income levels, the
government dare not implement income redistribution policies for fear that
low-income households would feel stigmatised and would not access the
programmes. On the other hand, initiatives such as price controls or free
universal provision of goods and services are not focused on a specific
group of beneficiaries, which eliminates the possibility of stigmatising low-
income households and makes it easier for those households to access the
services.12）
Even so, the main messages from the previous section do not change.
The government should amend or give up policies which would make
persons decide to stay inside rural areas or within particular professions
even though they have full ability to work in urban areas. It should also
redesign the whole set of grassroots policies to focus on rural development
and avoidance of social exclusion. In addition, even if low-income
households may feel stigmatised, the government should continue to
establish the optimal approach of a direct rich-to-poor income transfer
system.
(3) The Prayuth government’s tax reforms and their expected
income redistributive effects
Interim Prime Minister Prayuth stated in his policy speech in September
2014 that the government is to tackle various forms of societal inequality.
１２）Another merit of using some grassroots projects is that the government can
save its budget for the projects and can also focus on other important policies
at the same time.
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In order to realise this policy objective, the government announced that it
would start preparing for the establishment of a healthcare insurance
system to cover all Thai citizens, implement a plan to reduce the costs of
agricultural production, and so on.
Among many policy measures dedicated to income inequality
improvement, the Prayuth government’s plan for tax reform is particularly
aggressive. As stated earlier, in order to improve the equity of income
distribution, a direct rich-to-poor transfer of income is most efficient.
Indeed, the Prayuth government is considering introducing a property tax,
inheritance tax, and negative income tax and raising the value added tax
from the current special tax rate of 7% to the original tax rate of 10%. As
the uniform value added tax places a regressive burden on income, the
increase in the tax rate will have a more severe impact on low-income
households than on high-income households. On the other hand, inheritance
tax and property tax place progressive burdens on income when there is
positive correlation between income levels and the amounts of portfolio
assets. A negative income tax is a tax schedule which gives an income
supplement to those households with income below the lowest taxable
limit, with a proportion of the difference between income levels and the
government-set threshold. If all households were covered by the tax
system, the combination of such tax reforms would definitely realise more
equitable income distribution. However, only formal sector workers are
currently covered by the individual income tax system. While lower-income
formal sector workers may benefit from the reforms, low-income informal
sector workers cannot receive any benefit from a negative income tax
schedule but will bear an additional burden caused by the increase in the
value added tax. As a result, if all the tax reforms are implemented
without any expansion of households covered, all households will bear the
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burden regressively due to the increase in the value added tax with the
highest quintile bearing a greater burden of taxes on wealth and some
households in the fourth quintile receiving benefits by a negative income
tax. This may narrow the income gap between households in the lowest
and highest quintiles (i.e. decrease in the s5/s1 ratio) but worsen income
inequality (i.e. increase the Gini coefficient). Therefore, according to the
analysis in section 3, the Prayuth government’s tax reforms would
accelerate economic growth, but by a very small rate and only until 2019.
This means that Thailand has only five years to complete the creation of
an ideal taxation system through which the government can conduct a
direct rich-to-poor transfer of income. Taking this into account, the Thai
government should immediately start designing a tax system which will
cause the Gini coefficient to decline. More concretely, the government
should implement two actions to guarantee this objective. One is to
establish an institution to capture the income levels of all households
nationwide. The other is to maintain the value-added tax rate at 7% for a
certain group of goods and services rather than proceed with the increase
of the value-added tax rate to 10% (this treatment is the de facto special
reduced value-added tax rate), and reduce the number of goods and
services under the price controls and price monitoring regulations. As the
introduction of the special reduced value-added tax rate leads to an
opportunity loss of tax revenues for the government, the government will
be more cautious about selecting the goods and services to which the
reduced tax rate will be applied, which will reduce the burden on low-
income households caused by wrong design or inappropriate operation.
The reduction of the number of goods and services under price control and
monitoring will lead to a reduction of an excessive regulatory burden for
affected business sectors as well as improve income inequality.
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5.Conclusion
Thailand should tackle the problem of income inequality immediately.
The grassroots projects - a combination of policy measures targeting rural
areas, farmers, and low-income households - had played a role in improving
income inequality through narrowing regional income disparities. However,
as Thailand grows to become an upper-middle-income country, it should
promote agglomeration of industries and population into local core cities
and raise the labour productivity in rural areas after a portion of the
population has relocated from those areas. Taking this into consideration,
continuation of some previous individual grassroots projects would hamper
the development of local economies by overly restricting the mobility of
workers in rural areas or agricultural sectors, and would result in a
worsening of income disparities among the provinces. In addition, there are
individual grassroots projects that are clearly inefficient at improving
income inequality.
Therefore, Thailand should start designing and implementing a scheme
which guarantees a more direct rich-to-poor income transfer and redesign
and limit the use of grassroots policies. However, if the government
introduces an income transfer scheme through tax schedule without
developing the ability to capture the income levels of informal sector
workers, the scheme would realise an income transfer only among high-
income persons. There is an urgent need to establish an institution capable
of collecting and reporting income levels for households nationwide. Of
course, the problem of poverty must be addressed because it interferes
with citizens’ basic survival. As there are large numbers of the poor in
rural areas, there is a dire need to implement measures that combat social
exclusion in those areas. Even so, this must be realised through measures
compatible with the development of local economies, such as clustering
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industries and populations, and not through the previously ineffective and
worker-restricting grassroots projects of the past. Individual grassroots
projects should be amended and new measures should be introduced
immediately given the viewpoint described earlier.
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Abstract
In Thailand, a so-called ‘grassroots policy’ was implemented in the early
2000s as an attempt to solve income inequality among households
nationwide and income disparities among the provinces. The grassroots
policy was recognised as a policy staple for local communities regardless of
which political regime was in power, but after the coup d’état in 2014, the
interim government abolished some grassroots projects. It believed that
those projects caused a large loss of public expenditures and may have
been used for corruption, but abolishment of a project should be
determined after considering the appropriateness of targeted beneficiaries
and after examining the income redistributive effects of the project’s goals.
This study points out that continuation of some previous individual
grassroots projects would hamper the development of local economies by
overly restricting the mobility of workers in rural areas or agricultural
sectors, and would result in worsening of income disparities among the
provinces. Thailand is at a stage of development where tertiary industries
should become the leading industries. In order for those industries to
develop, the country should promote agglomeration of industries and
population into local core cities. Among the grassroots projects, the small-
scale rural development projects do not have a counter effect in principle
but were sometimes used merely to inject profits into individual businesses
and help individual household consumption. Admitting such wrong access
to these projects may result in reluctance of rural people to move to local
cities. The income support schemes for farmers have the effect of making
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farmers stick to their farmland in rural areas as long as the benefit is
sufficiently great.
Among the individual grassroots projects which did not have a counter
effect, some of them are clearly inefficient at improving income inequality
or were designed to have a counter effect to income inequality
improvement. Even for grassroots projects which were correctly motivated
and designed, some of them suffered operational mistakes, resulting in
failure to improve income inequality. A best policy option for income
inequality alleviation is a direct rich-to-poor income transfer, but, as only
formal sector workers are currently covered by the individual income tax
system in Thailand, introducing a tax schedule which guarantees a more
direct rich-to-poor income transfer would realise an income transfer only
among high-income persons. Therefore, the government should start
establishing an institution capable of collecting and reporting income levels
for households nationwide.
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